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UNIFORM LAWS IN NORTH DAKOTA
RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOYALTY PROGRAM-RIGHT OF
DISCHARGED FEDERAL EMPLOYEE TO JUDICIAL HEARING.
Appellant had been employed in the classified civil service of the
United States government and had been given a temporary re-
appointment to her former position pending a loyalty investigation
pursuant to Executive Order 9835.1 Two months subsequent to her
temporary reappointment, she was informed of the existence of
doubt as to her loyalty to the United States government. Following
a series of hearings, culminating in a decision by the Loyalty Review
Board affirming that reasonable grounds for belief of her disloyalty
existed, she was rated ineligible for federal employment and was
barred from competing in civil service examinations for three years.
At no time during the course of the hearings was she confronted
by her accusers and it was admitted that the charges were made by
persons not under oath. In this action she sought a declaratory
judgment and an order reinstating her in government employment,
claiming that she did not receive a fair trial before the Loyalty
Review Board. The Circuit Court held, one justice dissenting, that
a party seeking federal employment is not entitled of right to a
judicial hearing where there exists reasonable doubt as to that
party's loyalty to the United States government and therefore alleged
irregularities in the Loyalty Board hearing were not grounds for
reversal of that Board's findings. The court reversed, on authority
of United States v. Lovett,' so much of the Board's decision which
precluded appellant from participation in civil service examinations
for three years. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Clark,
not participating, the decision of the Circuit Court was affirmed by
an equally divided court. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), afj"d per curiam, 71 Sup. Ct. 669 (1951).
Although appellant in the instant case largely relies upon
the insufficiency of her hearing before the Loyalty Board, the
Circuit Court decision points out' that the important question is
whether she was in fact entitled to the hearing. There would
seem to be little doubt that in the exercise of proper procedure, the
executive department has the power to remove its employees,4 which
power is subject only to statutory limitations.! Under the existing
Civil Service regulations' appellant's right to a hearing is wholly
1 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, No. 9835 (1947).
By this order reinstatements were made subject to the condition that the
applicants could be removed if within 18 months investigation disclosed
certain disqualifications and among these was "(7) On all the evidence,
reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to
the Government of the United States."
2 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
a 182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("But the question is not whether she
had a trial. The question is whether she should have had one.")
4 Eberlein v. United States, 257 U.S. 82 (1921); Keim V. United States,
177 U.S. 290 (1900); Pawell v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 146 Pa. Super. 147, 22 A.2d 43 (1941). But where proper pro-
cedure was not followed, see Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126
(Ct. of Cl. 1948); Elchibegoff v. United States, 106 Ct. of Cl. 541
(1946) (like the instant case, the employee had only temporary ap-
pointment.
5 37 Stat. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §652 (1948 supp.). Under
authority of this act Executive Order 9835 was issued.
a Ibid.
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within the discretion of the removing officer.' The constitutionality
of such a result, however, must be considered further in light of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The Fifth
Amendment has been violated only if the appellant has been de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.' It
would seem settled now that government employ is not property'
but the early Supreme Court case of Cummings v. The State of
Missouri" disputed this finding.' There is no question of deprivation
of life or liberty in the instant case. The Sixth amendment, which
protects the right of a trial by jury in case of criminal prosecution,
has been violated only if the effect of the decision of the Loyalty
Board is to punish the appellant for her past misconduct. Such a
result could only be obtained by a trial by jury."
In United States v. Lovett' it was held that persons could not
be permanently excluded from government employ by act of Con-
gress since this was punishment, for which accused was entitled to
a trial by jury. '  In the instant case the court found that the three-
year proscription was punishment" but refused to extend this rule
to include mere dismissal.' In support of this position, it has been
said that dismissal from office constitutes no added punishment in
case of larceny but is the mere consequence of the conviction; 1 that
removal of a state official according, to procedure prescribed by the
legislature is not a criminal proceeding and not intended as punish-
ment;' that there was no punishment in a criminal sense where a
state law provided that a teacher could be removed for member-
ship in a subversive organization;" that a person has no constitutional
right to hold office and thus may be dismissed just as any other
employee;' and that a federal employee may be dismissed for pol-
7 Ibid. "No-. . . hearing shall be required except in the discretion of the
officer . . .directing the removal."
U.S. Const. Amend. V.
See Taylor v. Beckham, 1781 U.S. 548, 576 (1900).
10 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1886).
1 Id. at 320: "We do not agree with counsel . . . that 'to punish one is to
deprive him of life, liberty or property, and that to take from him any-
thing less than these is no punishment at all'. The learned counsel does
not use these terms-life, liberty and property-as comprehending every
right known to law. He does not include under liberty freedom from
outrage on the feelings as well as restraint on the person. He does not
include under property those estates which one may acquire in profes-
sions."
" United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
328 U.S. 303 (1946).
14 Id. at 314: "'What is involved here is a congressional proscription of
Lovett . . .'prohibiting (his) ever holding a government job. Were this
case to be not justiciable, congressional action, aimed at three individuals,
which stigmatized their reputations and seriously impaired their chance
to earn a living, could never be challenged in any court. Our constitution
did not contemplate such a result."
5 182 F.2d 46, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
" The court, for this purpose, conceded appellant's contention that she
was not a temporary employee but within the classified civil service.
" State v. Jones, 82 N.C. 685 (1880).
" Rankin v. Jauman, 4 Idaho 53, 36 Pac. 502 (1894).
9 L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, 276 App. Div. 494, 95 N.Y. Supp. 443
(1950), aff'd sub nom. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d
806 (1950).
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 N.E. 517 (1892)
("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman.")
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itical activity under the Hatch Act and this is not punishment. On
the other hand, several state courts,' including the 1951 Utah court
in Taylor v. Lee,22 have reached another conclusion and there is
wording in Supreme Court decisions' which would seem to take
a view contra to the instant case.
As was powerfully laid out in the dissent of the instant case,'
appellant would appear to have been convicted of disloyalty by the
proceedings in the Loyalty Board hearings.' This misleading effect,
however, would not seem to have a bearing upon her right to a
judicial trial since other instances of injury without remedy can be
found in the decisions.' The result is certainly unfortunate, as was
conceded in the instant case,2 ' but the pressing need for governmental
security in view of the present world conditions' makes insignificant
the slight to appellant's reputation. Appellant's standing in law is
untenable; otherwise her plight is only regrettable.
Daniel J. Chapman
21 State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 24 S.W. 457 (1893) (where con-
stitution said removal from office was punishment for misconduct in
office); Harris v. Terry, 98 N.C. 131, 3 S.E. 745 (1887) ("Imprison-
ment is infamous under the laws of the United States and the disquali-
fication to hold office is certainly a punishment that implies disgrace
and infamy . .. It is difficult to conceive of a punishment more galling
and degrading in this country than disqualification to hold office whether
one be an office seeker or not"); Taylor v. Lee, 226 P.2d 531 (Utah
1951); where the court cited with approval this excerpt from a previous
Utah case: "A removal for cause is a judicial act which affects the reputa
tion and rights of the accused. It is in law a punishment for crime, and the
proceeding provided by statute can no more be dispensed with in such
a case than a court can disregard the statutory provisions in the trial
of a cause where a person is charged with the commission of an offense."
226 P.2d 531 (Utah 1951).
2 See note 11, supra; also see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 105 (1947) (dissenting opinion): "The punishment provided is
immediate discharge and a permanent ban against reemployment in the
same position . . ."; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1866): "But to ex-
clude him, by reason of that offense, from continuing in the enjoyment
of a previously acquired right is to enforce a punishment for that offense
notwithstanding the pardon" (a case where the appellant was excluded
from practice of law before Supreme Court). Also see Washington v.
Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd. 182 F.2d 375 (D.C.
Cir. 1950): "A government employee has no right to appeal to the
courts from an order dismissing him from the service. I say so with the
full realization of the fact that such a dismissal may have very serious
and even devastating consequences to the employee in question."
24 182 F.2d 46, 66 (1950).
25 The Loyalty Board hearing was given wide notoriety in newspapers, as
was the subsequent Supreme Court decision and it is quite possible that
misconceptions resulted.
Anyone may be attacked with impunity by a Congressman while he is
on the floor of Congress. Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (App. D.C.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930)..27 182 F.2d 46, 50 (1950): "She was not given a trial in any sense oi1 the
word and she does not know who informed upon her. Thus viewed, her
situation appeals powerfully to our sense of the fair and just. But the
case must be placed in context and in perspective".
" The court takes judicial notice of the fact that the United States is
presently threatened by an adversary government which seeks to infil-
trate our government with its own agents.
